

Epistemological and socio-cultural modalities of self-consciousness in Kant

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Abstract

The article deals with conceptual-methodological and cultural representations of the sphere of self-consciousness by Kant. The authors reconstruct the conceptual repertoire used by Kant to develop the problem of self-consciousness; in particular, they compile interpretations of the term ‘consciousness of self’ as the central category in the critical cycle of his philosophy. Reviewing Kant’s legacy as a whole, the authors consider the conjugate dimensions of self-consciousness – these being transcendental, ethical, and imperative dimensions. In the transcendental dimension, self-consciousness appears as a kind of initial logical principle from which all cognitive actions and logical constructs are built. Self-consciousness acts here as a ‘pure apperception’, connecting two opposite lines of knowledge: sensuality and reason. In addition, they are united through consciousness that feelings and thoughts belong to a single cognitive act of the subject, who considers this action as his activity. The ethical dimension arises in Kant when he unfolds the moral side of self-consciousness as a guide for practical reason. This dimension reveals the essence of the self-consciousness of man as a subject of the socio-cultural process. Full-fledged self-consciousness is triggered by moral insight; a person recognizes the self-worth of moral principles and is guided by a unique internal instance – autonomous good will. The imperative dimension of self-consciousness directly follows from the ethical one, and it is set by Kant to solve the practical issues of everyday human life. It is self-consciousness (and not daily experience) that serves as the source of morality, i.e., when a moral deed is dictated by an inner conviction arising from an unconditionally accepted imperative that is based on duty. At the same time, a person should always treat himself and others as an end. In revealing Kant’s structure of self-consciousness, the authors mentioned that he was the first to apply the dilemma of the object and the subject and also expanded the interpretation of self-consciousness from simple self-reflection to spontaneous creative activity (as self-construction). The authors discuss the antinomian structure of self-consciousness and the collision of integrity in self-consciousness in Kant’s transcendental logic, which arise from the separation of the ideal and actual domains of self-consciousness. It is also noted that, in line with transcendental idealism, Kant thought of the true essence of man and his self-consciousness only within the framework of the speculative-noumenal dimension, downplaying the importance of sensual experience and everyday practical reality. In addition, Kant’s universalism resulted in the fact that in his development of the problem of self-consciousness, the plan of the internal sensual life of a particular, single individual remained unrequested. Summing up, the authors note that by building a new rationalistic construct of philosophical reflection, Kant developed a multidimensional scientific foundation for the representation of the process of self-consciousness, proposing the concept of a transcendental subject in cognition (as pure reason) and in culture (as practical reason). It is concluded that there is a tendency in Kant’s teaching of overcoming, overstepping the boundaries of ‘Self’ as a methodological premise for resolving the issue of self-consciousness in its epistemological and social comprehension.

Key words: Kant, the consciousness of self, dimensions of self-consciousness, pure apperception, reason, transcendental subject, moral duty

Introduction

Human life in the contemporary world takes place in the conditions of global changes affecting all spheres of existence. The growing abyss of economic and social crises, deepening deformations of value, the pressure of the information society, and the technocratization and digitalization of daily life pose new challenges to humanity. The humanitarian science of the third Millennium is confronted with the contradiction between the unprecedented growth of the technological capabilities of civilization and the moral adequacy of their application for the benefit of the individual, for the benefit of the development of culture and life in all its forms.

Among the main contemporary issues, the integrity of a man's inner world and his subjectivity will be especially dramatic in the foreseeable future. Will a man become a toy in the hands of the forces created by him? Will he come to be a prisoner of informational, cybernetic, neuro-cognitive, transhuman, biogenetic, and other kinds of technologies that are estranged from him? Will a person retain his authenticity, his capacity for independent cognition and self-determination, and his creative (not just consumer) entity? Thus, today, the issue of personality arises with a new force.

The quire of what, by and large, is destined for a human being in the new millennium – a new acquisition of oneself as a personality or the final loss of oneself up to impersonality – is of crucial importance for the current development of mankind. This is evidenced by the growth of anthropocentric research in such spheres of knowledge as philosophy, psychology, pedagogy, art, and religion.

One of the key issues of human phenomenology and fulfilled existence is the problem of self-consciousness (Shoemaker, 1984; Legrand, 2012). It takes a special place in the history of philosophical science and excites the greatest minds of civilization throughout the centuries-old path of the development of science: from ancient times to the Middle Ages and further from the Renaissance through Modernity up to the present (Kitcher, 2021; Thiel, 2006). This is quite understandable because the comprehension of the surrounding world (and one's place in it) begins with the understanding of oneself and one's inner world (Peacocke, 2014). Therefore, the sphere of self-consciousness, from the very first steps of humanitarian science formation, is the epicenter of the understanding of human personality and processes of knowledge and attitude to reality (Brinkmann, 2005).

Comprehension of the sphere of self-consciousness in various branches of scientific-humanitarian knowledge opens up an inexhaustible source of a man's experience of constructing a subjective picture of reality and his place in it (McDowell, 2009). The study of this intriguing experience attracts many scientists from various scientific schools and areas (Bermúdez, 1998; Moran, 1999). This is not accidental since today it is obvious that none of the significant humanitarian problems can be solved productively without understanding the sphere of self-consciousness (Rödl, 2007; Marcus, 2021).

In philosophical discourse, the problem of self-consciousness acts as a point of intersection of the most important lines of reflection of the very subject of philosophical science – the relationship between objective and subjective, consciousness and reality, as well as the laws of knowledge and development of nature, society, and human beings (Brook & DeVidi, 2001; Smith, 2020). To a certain extent, philosophy, as such, is a form of scientific self-consciousness because it incarnates the experience of human comprehension of oneself and one's relationship to the world, other people, and oneself and represents the search for ways to explain the picture of reality and a human's role in it (Pippin, 2014).

It is no secret that in the rationalistic dimension, the problem of self-consciousness was most fully deployed in German classical philosophy (Schulting, 2020;

Pinkard, 2002). Being the pinnacle of the development of European rationalism, this philosophy created a fundamental methodological space for fruitful reflection on this problem in other influential areas (phenomenology, Marxism, personalism, existentialism, hermeneutics, and others).

In the current period of the erosion of fundamentality, there is an increased interest in the classics of German idealism, especially the works of Kant and Hegel (Kitcher, 2011; Altman, 2014). So, according to A. Brook estimates over 45,000 new editions by Kant and/or publications about him have been published in the last two decades alone (Brook & Wuerth, 2020). Among the main topics of interest are issues of self-consciousness and self-knowledge (Beiser, 2008).

While addressing the issues of self-consciousness, German idealism broadly advanced its understanding from empirical explanation (as experienced and individual self-consciousness), on the one hand, and logical explanation (i.e., as pure self-consciousness representing the theoretical principle of logic), on the other hand, to the understanding of self-consciousness as an essential characteristic of the subject's activity (Bykova, 2020).

It should be noted that this transition had been prepared by the previous course of philosophical thought. Thus, in the time of Modernity in European philosophy, the category of the *subject* in an anthropological dimension came to the fore (Thiel, 2011), interest in real subjectivity developed, and the fundamental concept appeared to be *mind* (reason, thinking, and consciousness) as a human essence and as a universal principle, from which the definition of "I" originated (Brinkmann, 2005; Onof, 2010). The category of *subjectivity*, understood as the process of self-consciousness (and, consequently, self-knowledge and the deployment of one's own definitions), found itself at the epicenter of methodological constructions (Bykova, 2007).

Meanwhile, the representations of self-consciousness, given both from the side of *empiricism* and from the standpoint of *rationalism*, were, in fact, very mechanistic and resembled the functioning of a self-registering "apparatus." If, in the first case, feelings and associations were fixed in it, then in the second case, it imprinted thinking actions and operations.

Understanding the limitations of such representations and the need to affirm the active essence of self-consciousness turned philosophical research towards ethics to the study of not only the empirical or logical manifestations of "Self" but also the moral formations that guide the individual and which he realizes in his actions.

A significant shift in the development of the issue of self-consciousness is associated with Kant's teaching about *the transcendental subject*, which became a new milestone in the formation of the philosophical framework of Modernity (Klemm & Zoller, 1997).

The purpose of this article was to find out what important aspects and modes of representing the problem of self-consciousness were developed in Kant's works.

'Consciousness of Self' as a category of philosophical reflection

Considering the human being as the most significant phenomenon in the world, Kant believed that it is the presence of self-consciousness that makes him superior to all other beings. "The fact that the human being can have the 'I' in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this, he is a *person*, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, he is one and the same person ... This holds even when he cannot yet say 'I' because he still has it in thoughts, just as all languages must think it when they speak in the first person, even if they do not have a special word to express this concept of 'I'..." (Kant, 2006: 15).

Meanwhile, many Kant researchers point out that the literal term '*self-consciousness*' is not articulated in his works, and it is more appropriate to talk about the construct '*consciousness of self*.' There is an opinion that it is 'consciousness of self' is the central category in the critical cycle of his philosophy (Cousin, 1958; Powell, 1990). However, as A. Brook (2020) notes, there is reason to question this since, in his opinion, the *unified consciousness* is more likely to be central. For the sake of fairness, it should be taken into account that Kant never singled out "self-consciousness" as a separate problem area but discussed it in the context of developing other important problems for philosophy. And so, his reasoning for this problem was far from systematic. Further in the following section, we will try to briefly collect these thoughts, drawing on the theses presented in Brook's work (2020) to have a complete picture of this problem. According to this work, the conceptual repertoire of this category in Kant's works is quite wide and can be represented by seven points.

The *first point* concerns Kant's concepts as 'empirical self-consciousness' and 'transcendental apperception,' representing two different types of "consciousness of self": firstly, the non-reflexive experience of self in an inner sense, and secondly, revealing oneself through acts of apperception (Brook & Wuerth, 2020).

In turn, such an important term of Kant as '*transcendental apperception*' was also used by him in two different meanings: to denote the ability of synthesis and to represent what he called "*I think*", referring to the consciousness of oneself as a *subject* (Forgione, 2020). Noting the complexity of such perception in his Anthropology, Kant writes: "The 'I' of reflection contains no manifold and is always the same in every judgment ... On the other hand, *inner experience* contains the matter of consciousness and a manifold of empirical inner intuition" (Kant, 2006: 32).

The *second point*: consciousness of oneself as a subject committing acts of representation, perception, synthesis, i.e. actions belonging to oneself. As Kant believed, a person is aware of his identity by performing various perceptual and cognitive actions, and he considers himself as an author of deeds and not only as a passive impression recorder: "I exist as an intelligence that is merely conscious of its faculty for combination" (Kant, 1998: 260), "...the mind could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its representations... if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its action, which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity..." (Kant, 1998: 233).

The *third point*: in the inner sense, the individual is conscious of himself only as he appears to himself and not as he is. As Kant noted, when we recognize ourselves by focusing our representations in the inner sense, we "know even ourselves only .. as appearance ..." (Kant, 1998: 376). "Inner sense ... presents even ourselves to consciousness only as we appear for ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, since we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected" (Kant, 1998: 257).

As A. Brook (2020) comments, a person is conscious of himself and his own qualities to exactly the same extent as he is conscious of the qualities of other things since he himself and other things are conscious by him as they appear to him.

The *fourth point*: the referential mechanism, realized in the process of consciousness of oneself as a subject, does not require identification of oneself by ascribing any qualities to one. Through the referential act in which one acquires this self-consciousness, one "denotes" but does not "represent" oneself (Kant, 1998: 432). One designates oneself, not singling out "any quality whatsoever" in oneself (Kant, 1998: 419). It is about what S. Shoemaker (1968) later names "self-reference without identification." By directing one's consciousness towards oneself, one can recognize something as oneself without identifying it as oneself through the properties that one has attributed to the thing. As Kant concretized: "But it is obvious that the subject of inherence is designated only transcendently through the I that is appended to

thoughts, without noting the least property of it, or cognizing or knowing anything at all about it” (Kant, 1998: 419).

The *fifth point* indicates that in the content of being conscious of oneself as a subject “nothing manifold is given” (Kant, 1998: 248), but there is a pre-experienced fact of consciousness of oneself as a given.

Kant asserts ‘non-ascriptive reference to self’, since any qualities of one do not need to be known to recognize oneself as oneself. As Kant explains: “...through the I, as simple representation, nothing manifold is given” (Kant, 1998: 248), “... the I that I think is so, differs from the I that intuits itself” (Kant, 1998: 258), the subject exists for itself apart from what is grasped in intuition.

The *sixth point*: consciousness of self as subject is not yet knowledge of self. Since consciousness of self attaches nothing to the self, and so “... the consciousness of oneself is therefore far from being a cognition of oneself” (Kant, 1998: 260). A. Brook (2020) clarifies that when in Kant, a person is recognized as a subject, his pure consciousness of himself does not give any knowledge about himself.

The *seventh point* assumes that in the process of being conscious of self, one thinks of oneself as an integral and unified subject of present experience. Kant had no doubt that understanding himself as a subject, someone always recognizes himself as a “single common subject” (Kant, 1998: 416) of a variety of representations.

Kant's remarks, such as “bare consciousness” and the like, may cast doubt on his doctrine about the possibility of our understanding of the mind. As A. Brook (2020) emphasizes, the official interpretation of Kant's works on this issue boils down to the fact that we cannot know exactly what the structure of the mind is and what it consists of. In fact, Kant's original thesis was that we have pre-experienced knowledge about the mind. He had no doubt that we already know that the mind operates with some forms of intuition in which it represents things in space and time and that it is able to synthesize the raw variety of intuition. We do not know these forms directly, so we haven't intuitive, i.e., sense-derived knowledge about them. However, we can achieve knowledge about the functions of the mind (although we have almost no knowledge about how it is arranged). Taking into account this statement, Brook refers to Kant's position as functionalism (to comprehend the mind, we must understand how it functions and what it does or can do, that is, its functions) (Brook & Wuerth, 2020).

Kantian dimensions of self-consciousness

If we go further from the category ‘*conscious of self*,’ widen the circle of comprehension of Kant's legacy, and turn in general to the Kantian method and discourse, then it is easy to see that his works are built as a kind of refraction and deployment of various hypostases and aspects of self-consciousness. Many researchers of Kant take different approaches to comprehending his positions and thoughts regarding phenomenology and the process of self-consciousness (Gomes & Stephenson, 2017; Kitcher, 1999). First of all, the authors note that Kant distinguished between consciousness of oneself as an *object* and consciousness of oneself as a *subject*. Analyzing this dichotomy, B. Longuenesse (2017), in one of her last works, notes Kant's unique merit in recognizing the special property of self-consciousness, namely, one's consciousness of being engaged in bringing rational unity into the contents of one's mental states. Considering the Kantian concept of the subject, E. Molina (2017) notes its attributive connection with a self-consciousness that, in principle, should be able to express itself through the term “I.” In this regard, he analyzes three types of self-consciousness in Kant: transcendental self-consciousness (or apperception), empirical self-consciousness, and the supposed self-consciousness of the I as it is in itself, that is, the sort of self-consciousness that would imply the possibility that the subject knows itself precisely as it is in itself. In accordance, he also distinguishes three modes of conceiving such a thinking I: as the transcendental I,

as the phenomenal I, and as the noumenal I (Molina, 2017: 78). Using this set of concepts, Molina considers the possibility that Kant understands “I” as a substance and, at the same time, as a subject.

In identifying various aspects of self-consciousness, we consider it expedient to take into account not only Kant’s metaphysics and epistemology but also his ethical-anthropological constructions. Kant himself enables us to define such aspects of self-consciousness by formulating three basic questions for reason in “Critique of Pure Reason”: “All interest of my reason (the speculative as well as the practical) is united in the following three questions:

1. What can I know?
2. What should I do?
3. What may I hope?” (Kant, 1998: 677).

The above questions of philosophy simultaneously reveal important aspects of self-consciousness, and the answers to them are aimed at solving the common problem node – “What is a man?” (Kant, 1998: 677).

The first question, Kant believed, is answered by his theoretical philosophy (“Critique of Pure Reason”) and the second by practical philosophy (“Critique of Practical Reason”). As for the third question, the situation was more complicated, and the answer to it can be found in several of Kant’s later works (such as “Criticism of Judgment,” “Metaphysics of Morals,” “And the End of Everything”). And finally, the question of man is solved in “Anthropology,” the last fundamental work of the philosopher (Kant, 2006). Without aiming to analyze the classical works of Kant (which has already been done in science in full measure), we will only highlight some ways of representing the phenomenon and the process of self-consciousness that is captured in his works and which, in our opinion reflect the essential aspects of the problem of self-consciousness as a whole.

Adhering to Kant’s development of the three mentioned questions for philosophy, we considered it reasonable to single out three quite expected dimensions of self-consciousness (which, however, do not directly coincide with these questions but follow from their solution): *transcendental*, *ethical*, and *imperative*. If the first dimension stands out as completely independent, then the other two are closely intertwined so that the last dimension (imperative) acts as a derivative of the second (ethical) and complements the first (transcendental).

Transcendental dimension

The first question is solved by Kant in the doctrine of the transcendental method of cognition, which played the role of the “Copernican revolution” in philosophy (Pinkard, 2002: 36). “I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our *a priori* concepts of objects in general” (Kant, 1998: 133). Knowledge comes from self-knowledge and involves initial conversion and comprehension of the ways our consciousness is functioning. This is pure self-consciousness, addressed to the primary givenness of our thinking, to its forms, methods, and operations (Brook & Wuerth, 2020).

It must be admitted that Kant presents self-consciousness not as a psychological phenomenon but as a kind of initial logical principle. That is, all constructions of pure logic (its laws, categories, mechanisms) must be derived from self-consciousness, which is considered by Kant as the principle of logical unity in general (Crowther, 2010). According to Kant, self-consciousness, acting as a *pure apperception* in the process of cognition, connects two basic and essentially opposing lines of cognition: sensuality (receptivity) and reason (spontaneous activity) (Sethi, 2021). The reason as it is cannot make such a connection; its synthesizing actions (the application of categories to sensory experience) are not enough to unite these lines of cognition. They are united through the consciousness that feelings and thoughts belong to a single cognitive act of the subject, who considers this action as his own activity. Kant

accented that "... only because I ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness (of original apperception) can I say of all perceptions that I am conscious of them" (Kant, 1998: 240).

Thus, it is in the act of self-consciousness that Kant assumes the unity of man's cognitive life and his active role as a *subject* in the process of cognition. The same unity is also meant by P. Keller (1999), arguing that Kant's transcendental self-consciousness underlies the general concept of objectivity and subjectivity equally. The same aspect is noted by A. Brook (1994) in his famous work "Kant and the Mind," describing in Kant the mind's ability to synthesize a single, coherent representation of self and world; he points to the unity it must have to do so, and the mind's awareness of itself and the semantic apparatus it uses to achieve this.

Self-consciousness functions not only through synthesis but also proceeds from the ongoing synthesis of a special property. The prerequisite for this synthesis is *transcendental apperception*, which is understood as a capacity to link 'all appearances' together into 'one experience' (Schulting, 2020). Kant introduced this type of synthesis in addition to the three primary ones – "apprehending in intuition, reproducing in imagination, and recognizing in concepts" (Kant, 1998: 227-231). Thus, he substantiated the wholeness and identity of the mind and the mind's representation of itself as a subject in all its manifestations (Kant 1998:232-233). This ability is found in Kant in forms such as long review and gathering, passing, perception, and binding, i.e., it can be fairly characterized as a *process*. Through transcendental perception, Kant presents not only the possibility of self-consciousness but also sets the stage for a *unified consciousness* (Brook & Wuerth, 2020). According to Kant, various impressions can "...represent something in me only insofar as they belong with all the others to one consciousness. Hence, they must at least be capable of being connected in it" (Kant, 1998: 237).

Ethical dimension

Solving the second question ("What should I do?"), Kant (1996) unfolds the moral side of self-consciousness (as a guide for *practical reason*), revealing the life-sense insights that come to anyone who ever addresses oneself with honesty and deep inner responsibility. To this key question, Kant fully devotes his famous ethical teaching, which follows from his understanding of the content and essence of the self-consciousness of human as a subject of the socio-cultural process (Cholbi, 2016). As T. Powell (1990) notes, in Kantian philosophy, the ways in which we represent ourselves to ourselves create the grounds not only for epistemology but also for our understanding of personality and our own immortality, as well as for moral philosophy.

Having put the problem of human freedom and dignity in the primary position, Kant finds it impossible to solve it within the framework of epistemology by the action of pure reason (empirical self-knowledge) limited by natural phenomena and processes. Therefore, the understanding of universal-outlook issues is assumed by him in the field of "*practical reason*" – a vast cultural-historical sphere of experience (Kant & Wood, 1996).

Man's self-consciousness in this field, i.e., following "practical reason," makes him free. This is explained by the fact that practical reason performs constitutive and legislative functions, which Kant associates with the ability of a person to make his fate dependent only on himself. According to Kant, the basis of the content of an individual's self-consciousness is moral principle (Stern, 2011). Kant's idea of the autonomy of morality presupposes the priority and self-worth of moral principles, as well as the recognition of the autonomy of a self-conscious personality who is guided by a unique internal instance – *autonomous good will*. This category denotes an internal "built-in" determinant of a man's purpose; in Kant, it is like a moral compass,

“...the worth of which surpasses all else... Here it would be easy to show how common human reason, with this compass in hand, knows very well how to distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil” (Kant & Wood, 1996: 58).

The growth of self-consciousness is associated with a man’s moral improvement. The loss of morality testifies to the inferiority of self-consciousness. Sometimes, in science, the paths of *knowledge* and the *human* (focus on the Good) may not coincide. Then science can break away from morality, and a scientist (or teacher), as Kant (1996) figuratively puts it, can turn into a kind of Cyclops because he loses his “philosophical eye” and isolates himself in the prejudices of any single area of available experience and knowledge. Kant’s thought on this was accurately quoted by H. Wilson: “I name such a scholar a Cyclops. He is an egoist of science, and he is still in need of an eye, which makes [it so] that he still sees his object from the point of view of other people. The humanity of the sciences is grounded upon this, that is, to give the affability of judgment through which one is subjected to others’ judgment. ...The second eye is therefore the self-knowledge of human reason, without which we have no sure eye for the size of our knowledge” (Wilson, 2006: 118).

Imperative dimension

This dimension directly follows from Kant’s ethical theory and acts as its practical refraction in the course of everyday life. According to Kant, reliance on the moral resource of self-consciousness enables man to fully and definitively answer the central question – “What should I do?”. It is necessary to lean on *good will* and be guided by an internal *duty* to the self, as well as to others *as an end* (but not as a means). Thus, the imperative order of life follows from moral existence (Timmermann, 2006).

According to Kant, moral categories emerge a priori from self-consciousness and cannot follow from experience. Daily experience is at odds with morality, does not serve as a source of righteousness, and a moral act is dictated by an inner conviction or *imperative*, which sometimes opposes the immoral practice of everyday life (Cholbi, 2016).

Thus, moral acts are determined by the ***categorical imperative***. A man does not strive for some goal, and his actions are not a means to achieve something (*hypothetical imperative*). These actions are valuable and necessary as such. Man is driven by the fulfillment of a categorical imperative that is based on *Duty*; it is not any other motive or inclination: “...act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (Kant & Wood, 1996: 73). Ultimately, “one’s own perfection and the happiness of others” (Kant & Wood, 1996: 517) is the final formula of duty. The imperative dimension of self-consciousness is set by Kant to solve the practical issues of everyday human life. It is this aspect of self-consciousness that Kraus (2020) develops in his recent work on Kant, pursuing the idea that our self or person is not something we find but something we must achieve.

At the same time, Kant warns against extremes in following duty, believing that a person should not lose common sense and humanity in doing so, and always treats himself and others *as an end*: “...the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, *not merely as a means* to be used by this or that will at its discretion; instead he must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or also to other rational beings, always be regarded *at the same time as an end*” (Kant & Wood, 1996: 79). It is a person’s conscious and understanding of himself as an end that underlies the Kantian concept of *dignity*.

Having opened such a value horizon and ethical space for self-consciousness, Kant got the opportunity to answer the third question of his philosophical search (“What can I hope for?”). It is obvious that the answer is connected with the moral growth of a person, with his free going to *duty* and the *highest good*. For Kant, hope as such

does not meet the requirements of morality (and sometimes, vice versa) and cannot serve as a solid basis for moral growth. And therefore, morality is set not so much by hope as by consciousness of that there is a law based on reason. Meanwhile, for a person (as a rational being), hope is associated rather not with morality, but with happiness (often understood in a mercantile sense). To overcome this discrepancy and connect morality with happiness, Kant developed the notion of the *highest good* (Kant & Wood, 1996).

The highest good in Kant is the category of happiness, tied to the moral potential of a person and to his dignity. Morality in this concept has an initial value; it is not set by the desire for happiness. Meanwhile, human happiness is also not entirely determined by morality. So, is there any hope for happiness? And can it correspond to the highest good? Certainly, for Kant, such a hope exists if one accepts the *existence of God*. Only in God can a person find for himself such an important unity of morality and happiness (in real life or beyond) (Kant & Wood, 1996).

Thus, hope in Kant (1996) grows on the soil of morality, on the movement towards the highest good (and God), backed up by a sense of duty. Herewith, duty only installs a law that, penetrating the soul, finds respect for itself here and silences all inclinations. For Kant (2006), the bearer of duty and its noble destiny is the personality as a hypostasis of a human being, elevating him above himself (as a member of the sensual world). While the individual is defined by the principle “I think,” the personality is more than a bearer of consciousness but embodies the process of self-consciousness. According to Kant (2006), being a personality is equivalent to being free, relying on self-consciousness in actions.

Thus, freedom in Kant's teachings is impossible outside the moral state of a person who is driven by internal duty in the hope of achieving the highest good, “*a free will and a will under moral laws are the same*” (Kant & Wood, 1996: 95). Based on the above, it is possible to reconstruct the Kantian logic of person self-realization, which can be represented by the following categorical chain: from “self-consciousness” (personality) to “duty” and from it to “freedom.”

Antinomies of self-consciousness structure

As is already clear, in his views on man (personality), Kant, unlike previous idealist philosophers, applies and relies on the category of *subject*. Man as a subject (endowed with self-consciousness) rises above everyday life but at the same time, is organically connected with it and, in this regard, acts simultaneously as an object for external forces.

This ambiguity of understanding of the personality emerges (as we noted above) in Kant's idea about the contradictive experience of man's consciousness of his “I.” Kant describes this experience in his characteristic manner of methodological disjunction that is his wont, through separating and opposing two equal and genuine assertions (*antinomies*). In “Anthropology,” he remarks that the consciousness of oneself already contains in itself a certain contradiction, a twofold “I”: “... consciousness of oneself (*apperception*) can be divided into that of reflection and that of apprehension. The first is a consciousness of understanding, *pure* apperception; the second a consciousness of inner sense, *empirical* apperception... here the “I” appears to us to be double (which would be contradictory): 1) the “I” as a *subject* of thinking (in logic), which means pure apperception (the merely reflecting “I”⁰, and of which there is nothing more to say except that it is a very simple idea; 2) the “I” as *object* of perception, therefore of inner sense, which contains a manifold of determinations that make an inner *experience* possible” (Kant, 2006: 23).

In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant also makes a similar distinction: “... the I that I think is to differ from the I that intuit itself ... I am also given to myself in intuition, only, like other phenomena, not as I am for the understanding but rather as I appear to

myself, this is no more and no less difficult than how I can be an object for myself in general and indeed one of intuition and inner perceptions” (Kant, 1998: 258-259).

The presented inconsistency of the “I” structure is resolved by Kant (1996) in his doctrine about the role and relationship of the *two worlds* in human life – phenomenal and intelligible. Being a part of the sensually perceived or *phenomenal world*, a person depends on external forces and acts as a toy in the hands of circumstances. In such a world, he is not free; he obeys the environment, the laws of nature, and social influences, and his self-consciousness is curtailed. However, as a member of the intelligible or *noumenal world*, as a “thing-in-itself,” a person is endowed with freedom and acquires self-consciousness. Kant explained: “As a rational being, and thus as a being belonging to the intelligible world, the human being can never think of the causality of his own will otherwise than under the idea of freedom; for, independence from the determining causes of the world of sense (which reason must always ascribe to itself) is freedom” (Kant & Wood, 1996: 99).

It is worth emphasizing that the category of “*thing-in-itself*” applied by Kant to a person does not mean an isolated or closed self-consciousness (Oizerman, 1981). Rather conversely, Kant asserts with this category the limitless capacity of self-consciousness and self-realization of a person as a “*thing-in-itself*” (Kant, 1998).

Considering the intelligible world, Kant (2006) noted that the origins of the phenomenal, sensual world are refracted in it so that a man can see through it the diversity of his “I” without losing his integrity. In addition, Kant (2006) insisted that in the process of self-consciousness, a man is able to constantly monitor these changes that come with him while remaining the same subject: “To ask, given the various inner changes within a man’s mind (of his memory or of principles adopted by him), when a person is conscious of these changes, whether he can still say that he remains *the very same* (according to his soul), is an absurd question. For it is only because he represents himself as one and the same *subject* in the different states that he can be conscious of these changes. The human “I” is indeed twofold according to form (manner of representation), but not according to matter (content)” (Kant, 2006: 23).

On the level of personality, for Kant, the noumenal character determines the phenomenal character, and therefore, the former must govern the latter and behavior in general (Wood, 1984: 91-92). In pedagogical terms, this means that education should be aimed at developing a noumenal character so that a person is guided by this character in life and learns to subordinate his life to Duty (Kant, 2007).

According to Kant (1996), *conscience* can serve as an internal help on this path that elevates a person, keeping him in the noumenal dimension and preventing him from plunging into the phenomenal world. A developed conscience means the possession of an amazing mechanism of self-control, which excludes the duality of a person and leads to the unity of his thinking and behavior, ideas, and actions (Kant & Wood, 1996). The “internal court” of the conscience over a person presupposes the presence of another person in his consciousness. “For all duties, a human being’s conscience will, accordingly, have to think of *someone other* than himself (i.e., other than the human being as such) as the judge of his actions if the conscience is not to be in contradiction with itself. This other may be an actual person or a merely ideal person that reason creates for itself” (Kant & Wood, 1996: 560). It is not difficult to convince that in Kant, the problem of self-consciousness is revealed not only through moral but also through social-moral refraction.

Collision of the integrity of self-consciousness in transcendental logic

Turning to Kant’s constructions, it is not difficult to detect a collision of the integrity of self-consciousness in the transcendental logic applied by him. This conclusion is consistent with the results of studies by several authors. So, M.F. Bykova emphasizes that Kant exactly captured the dual essence of self-consciousness, in which knowledge about two different types of objectivity is refracted: “actual objectivity (to

be ‘*in front of me,*’ to be directly the subject for I) and ideal objectivity (transcendental)’ (Bykova, 1992: 191). In the functioning of self-consciousness, Kant assigns the leading role to the transcendent sphere. Meanwhile, the content of this sphere is presented in self-consciousness in an implicit form, and some work is required to determine the manifestations of the transcendent. According to Kant's intention, this determination is possible in the categories of transcendental logic. This approach ultimately leads to a certain conceptual circle, which only Hegel will be able to break. The fact is that from the standpoints of transcendental idealism (represented later in the works of Fichte and Schelling), all the constructions of pure logic must unfold from self-consciousness (forms, laws, and categories). As M.F. Bykova writes, despite that “...self-consciousness in the form of pure apperception is declared by Kant as the principle of logical unity in general and at the same time as the principle of transcendental logic, the principle itself turns out to be unrealized. It remains unclear how the variety of definitions belonging to pure subjectivity is produced, and what the beingness and ways of reaching the objectivity of pure apperception of self-consciousness are” (Bykova, 1992: 191).

After Kant, many philosophers made considerable efforts to bridge this discontinuity between the transcendent and the real, and only Hegel succeeded in resolving this difficulty. He was able to break the mentioned circle of argumentation and theoretically develop the concept of self-consciousness, revealing the real dialectical content of this phenomenon (Bykova, 2020).

Nevertheless, we must pay tribute to the genius of Kant, who opened the way to understanding the phenomenon of the cognizing and acting *subject*. This idea is shared by many researchers. In particular, according to S. Sedgwick's conclusion, it is Kant who encourages us to realize that “...not only must we be willing to challenge a deterministic account of human behavior, we also need to be persuaded that the only adequate way to do so requires that we suppose that our freedom is “transcendental” and our spontaneity “absolute.” We, in other words, have to accept the idea that we are subjects capable of initiating actions from outside time, subjects which have in addition to an “empirical” character an “intelligible” character” (Sedgwick, 1998: 3).

Conclusion

Thus, the considered provisions of Kant allow rethinking his fundamental contribution to the development of the problem of self-consciousness. It lies in the versatility and branching of his approach, which brings the reflection of the process of self-consciousness into a broad philosophical-humanitarian context of understanding the most important issues of cognition and development of a man as a fully realized personality. In Kant's works, the problem of self-consciousness appears as an invisible inner thread of the amazing necklace of his philosophy, on which the precious parts of his teaching are strung alternately: from phenomenology and epistemology up to ethics. Building a new rationalistic construct of philosophical reflection, Kant developed a multidimensional scientific foundation for the representation of the process of self-consciousness, proposing the concept of a transcendental subject in cognition (as pure reason) and in culture (as practical reason). In revealing the structure of self-consciousness, he was the first to apply the dilemma of the object and the subject and also expanded the interpretation of self-consciousness from simple self-reflection to spontaneous creative activity (as self-construction). And finally, in his ethical teaching, the becoming of self-consciousness was presented as a process of man's moral self-improvement.

However, in line with transcendental idealism, Kant thought of the true essence of man and his self-consciousness only within the framework of a speculative noumenal dimension that rejects sensual experience and everyday practical reality. Therefore, his teaching does not provide for the resulting exit of self-consciousness through free

and spontaneous self-realization, but rather a kind of escape from everyday life to fulfill an internal duty.

Summing up the above survey of the different dimensions of the self-consciousness problem in Kant, the prevailing tendency of universality and universalism in his approach should be noted as inherent in German classical philosophy. The fact is that in his appeal to the phenomenon of self-consciousness, the plan of the internal sensual life of a particular, single individual remained unrequested. Kantian logicism (as, in fact, German idealism) did not take into account such important subjective explications of the "I" as irrational, unconscious, and other representations of a sensual genesis. Therefore, the emotional-relational side of self-consciousness has not received scientific development. So, for example, in Kant, self-relationship as an area of self-consciousness was considered only as a manifestation of the mind and did not have an independent non-rational phenomenology. Self-attitude was determined by faith in the correctness (reasonableness) of one's actions.

Despite this limitation in considering the self-consciousness issue, it is impossible to imagine the development of current humanitarian and personological knowledge outside the context of the scientific heritage of this outstanding philosopher. In his teachings, he made an "epistemological breakthrough" to a fundamental understanding of the human culture and his self-consciousness. This was largely ahead of its time and still serves as a valuable source of building heuristic concepts of personality research both in theoretical and applied plans.

Addressing the heritage of this great classic of German idealism, we discover a heuristic idea of overcoming and outgrowing the limits of "I" in understanding the fullness of self-consciousness. A human being is conscious not so much of his own "I" but rather of "I" in culture. This idea still serves as a fruitful methodological basis for the comprehension of self-consciousness issues in psychology, sociology, cultural studies and other branches of the humanities.

So, returning to Kant, it is necessary to emphasize that the issue of self-consciousness is considered by the philosopher in line with the concept of a transcendental cognizing subject who defines his limits non-spatially and non-temporally (Addison, 2020). Through Kant's efforts, the human "Self," for the first time in philosophical discourse, acquires a social-moral aspect, and the development of self-consciousness is conditioned by moral self-improvement of a person, and conscious dedication to duty.

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